Nucleation and motion of kink pairs on partial dislocations are examined by elasticity theory for materials with a high Peierls stress. Two approaches are used: one considers the change in average stacking-fault energy due to alloying elements and the other considers the change in local SFE due to a nearby solute atom. Both approaches highlight the role of SFE on kink nucleation, propagation and annihilation and both furnish strain rate as a function of stress, temperature and SFE. Model predictions are (...) compared with yield stress data for two systems: firstly, an intermetallic, MoSi 2 , which softens for alloying elements that decrease the SFE and hardens for Re additions that increase the SFE; secondly, a ceramic oxide, MgO-Al 2 O 3 spinel, which softens with increasing addition of excess alumina and at the same time exhibits a decrease in SFE. The average SFE approach agrees qualitatively with the data while quantitative agreement is obtained with the local SFE approach. The possibility is considered that the model applies to other materials, such as TiAl, HfV 2 and Fe 3 Al, which show softening with certain alloying additions. One requirement is that the dislocations are dissociated more than a few atomic distances; otherwise kink nucleation occurs on the perfect dislocation . Hence the model does not apply to materials such as bcc metals which only have a core dissociation. Normal hardening effects of solutes from size and modulus misfits are additive with any softening effects from a decrease in SFE and so may mask the latter, as occurs for W additions to MoSi 2. (shrink)

In the early part of the paper, I attempt to explain a dispute between two parties who endorse the compositionality of language but disagree about its implications: Paul Horwich, and Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore. In the remainder of the paper, I challenge the thesis on which they are agreed, that compositionality can be taken for granted. I suggest that it is not clear what compositionality involves nor whether it obtains. I consider some kinds of apparent counterexamples, and compositionalist responses (...) to them in terms of covert indexicality and unspecific meanings. I argue that the last option is the best for most of the cases I consider. I conclude by stressing, as against Horwich and Fodor and Lepore, that the appropriate question concerns the extent to which compositionality obtains in a natural language, rather than whether it obtains or not, so that the answer is essentially messy, requiring detailed consideration of a wide range of examples. (shrink)

The paper argues that intensional phenomena can be explained without appealing to "exotic" entities: one that don't exist, are merely possible, or are essentially abstract.

Proposed solutions to the problems of this country's health care system range along a spectrum from central planning to free market. Central planners and free market advocates provide various ethical justifications for the policies they propose. The crucial flaw in the philosophical rationale of central planning is failure to distinguish between normative and metanormative principles, which leads to mistaken understanding of the nature of rights. Natural rights, based on the principle of noninterference, provide the link between individual morality and social (...) order. Free markets, the practical expression of natural rights, are uniquely capable of achieving the goals that central planners seek but find beyond their grasp. The history of this country's health care system and the experiences of other nations provide evidence of the superiority of free markets in reaching for the goals of universal access, control of costs, and sustaining the quality of health care. (shrink)

This concise, lively introduction to ancient Greek philosophy will help beginning students of both classical studies and philosophy get their bearings within an important yet complex array of names, schools, and ideas. The book illuminates the key period from the sixth to the third century BC, looking at the ideas that engaged the Greeks, in particular those of the Presocratics, the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the earliest Hellenistic philosophers. After chronologically mapping the main figures and their interconnections, _Introducing Greek (...) Philosophy_ focuses on themes especially relevant to philosophy today, including the origins of the universe and its mathematical structures; divine creation versus evolution and natural law; probability theory and the criteria for truth; political debates on democracy, citizen rights, and state obligations; and finally ethics, happiness, and the best way to live. (shrink)

This work is devoted to the testing, research and comparative analysis of the most well-known and widely used methods and algorithms for clustering numerical data sets. Multidimensional scaling was applied to evaluate the results of solving the clustering problem by visualizing datasets at all stages of the implementation of the studied algorithms. All algorithms were tested for artificial and real data sets. As a result, for each of the investigated algorithms, the main characteristics were formulated in the form of their (...) relative strengths and weaknesses. Based on the test results, conclusions and recommendations for using these algorithms are formulated. (shrink)

I argue that there is no straightforward inference from there being fictional characters to any interesting form of realism. One reason is that “fictional” may be an intensional operator with wide scope, depriving the quantifier of its usual force. Another is that not all uses of “there are” are ontologically committing. A realist needs to show that neither of these phenomena are present in “There are fictional characters”. Other roads to realism run into difficulties when negotiating the role that presupposition (...) plays when we make intuitive evaluations of the truth or falsehood of sentences involving fiction, for we may presuppose things we do not believe. This means that a judgment of truth, implicitly relative to a presupposition we do not believe, can be sincerely made by someone who, from a more austere perspective, would regard the judgment as false. (shrink)

This belongs to a symposium about Crispin Wright's Truth\nand Objectivity. Wright entertains the "possibility of a\npluralist view of truth." I suggest that this should not\nentail ambiguity in the word "true." For truth to amount to\ndifferent things for different kinds of subject matter no\nmore entails ambiguity than does the fact that existence\namounts to different things for different kinds of entity.\nTurning to cognitive command, I argue that it is trivially\nsatisfied: if I judge that p and you disagree, then under\nsuitable conditions I must (...) take it that something is wrong\nwith your cognitive mechanisms. (shrink)

The development of a philosophical anthropology capable of doing justice to the "facts" of human action and agency is the leitmotif of this work whose central thesis is that "the act/agent relation is fundamental for an understanding of the self and must be kept distinct from the behavior/personality relation so often but mistakenly believed to exhaust the meaning of human life and conduct." To establish this thesis Browning offers first, a phenomenological analysis of human action, and then, a deduction of (...) the requisites of human agency entailed by his phenomenology of action. In the concluding section of the book, the ramifications of the act/agent analysis developed in the two previous sections for a comprehensive philosophical anthropology are tentatively explored. This is an ambitious and serious work, but one marred by a laconic presentation. A plethora of interesting ideas and distinctions are introduced, but too often without the detailed argument required to make them plausible or even fully intelligible.—V. R. M. (shrink)

This volume contains twenty-one selected articles and lectures written by the author over a period of some two decades. The remarkable range of McCulloch's abilities and interests is attested to by the diverse character of the contents, which range from neurophysiology to poetry and a scathing attack on Freud and psychoanalysis. Despite the dazzling diversity of topics treated, there is a readily discernible theme underlying all of McCulloch's work. It is represented explicitly in such papers as the classic "A Logical (...) Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity," a progenitor of more recent automata studies, and "Why the Mind is in the Head," McCulloch's contribution to the Hixon Symposium. This theme is, in the author's words, "the attempt to found a physiological theory of knowledge" or "experimental epistemology." Philosophers who take identity solutions to the mind-body problem seriously will applaud McCulloch's ingenious and sustained efforts to bridge the gap between conceptual analysis of mental concepts and painstaking scientific investigation of the physical "embodiments" of mental processes. Nevertheless, many philosophers will also be irritated by the way in which McCulloch tends to use mentalistic concepts. When nerve impulses are treated as atomic propositions and thinking is unhesitatingly attributed to a reverberating neural circuit, one cannot help but feel that genuine philosophical issues are in serious danger of being obscured rather than illumined.—V. R. M. (shrink)

The place of Thomas’ many expositions of and commentaries on the works of Aristotle has to be faced sooner or later by any student of his thought. If his thought is essentially an extended footnote to Aristotle’s, those commentaries will be of supreme importance; if, thanks to the role of esse, Thomas’ thought is unlike any other before or since, Aristotle can be cast in the role of principal foil the better to show forth the originality of Thomism. That Thomas (...) himself seems to be unaware of any fundamental divergence between himself and Aristotle, that the commentaries represent an effort that continues into the last period of his life, going on independently of his teaching, only adds zest to the question. And, needless to say, when we compare the Thomistic commentaries and their discernment of a well-wrought literary whole in each of the works of Aristotle, including the Metaphysics, with the fragmented Aristotle who survives in the wake of Jaeger’s influence, the matter becomes irresistably attractive. What precisely is Thomas doing as he pores over the text of Aristotle? (shrink)

We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)

[R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans gives (...) no adequate account of 'really', and I point to unclarities in Wiggins's similar, but distinct, attempt to use 'really' in the logical form of true negative existentials. /// [David Wiggins] Evans was not wrong (I maintain) to say that the senses of genuine proper names invoke and require objects. Names in fiction or hypothesis mimic such names. Pace Evans, Sainsbury and free logicians, proper names are scopeless. (Evans's 'Julius' is not a name.) Names create a presumption of existential generalization. In sentences such as 'Vulcan does not really exist', that presumption is bracketed. The sentence specifies by reference to story or report a concept identical with Vulcan and declares it be really uninstantiated. (The sentence, which partakes of play, is a kind of palimpsest.) It is explained why this second level view of 'exists' is to be preferred. (shrink)

I had a strange dream, or half-waking vision, not long ago. I found myself at the top of a mountain in the mist, feeling very pleased with myself, not just for having climbed the mountain, but for having achieved my life's ambition, to find a way of answering moral questions rationally. But as I was preening myself on this achievement, the mist began to clear, and I saw that I was surrounded on the mountain top by the graves of all (...) those other philosophers, great and small, who had had the same ambition, and thought they had achieved it. And I have come to see, reflecting on my dream, that, ever since, the hard-working philosophical worms have been nibbling away at their systems and showing that the achievement was an illusion. True, their skeletons, indigestible to worms, remained, and were surprisingly similar to one another. But I was led to think again about what one can, and what one cannot, achieve in this direction. (shrink)

In this work, the author has fashioned out of the logical and linguistic theses of his earlier books a full-scale but readily intelligible account of moral argument.